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Become Moot When Pollution Violations
Are Cured?
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by William L. Andreen
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 7-12. © 1999 American Bar Association.
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Early in the 1970s, Congress turned
its attention to the quality of
the nation's water resources and
found that the existing federal
water-pollution-control program had
failed to slow water pollution.
Confronted with the dual problems
of water-quality degradation and the
lack of an effective program for controlling water pollution, Congress
chose to chart a new course when it
enacted the Clean Water Act in
1972. Since one of the weaknesses
of the earlier program lay in the
area of enforcement, Congress
designed the new Act with an eye
toward enforceability.
The control strategy of the Clean
Water Act pivots around a broad
prohibition against "the discharge of
any pollutant by any person" from a
point source to waters of the United
States, unless the discharger complies with a number of requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
The Act required the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to establish technology-based
effluent limitations that apply to

,.,.... . '[,A<,.

.

tit

every discharger in a particular
industrial category.
To implement and monitor compliance with these limitations, as well
as any more stringent discharge
limitations needed to meet waterquality standards in a receiving
water, the EPA requires that every
discharger must obtain a permit and
comply with its terms. The National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) issues these permits, which serve as a mechanism
for transforming most regulatory
requirements into obligations
applicable to a specific discharger.
More than 40 states have been
authorized to issue NPDES permits,
and these states must apply federal
requirements unless their own regulations are more stringent.
Enforcement was greatly facilitated
by this permit scheme because precise numerical limits are generally
imposed upon point-source dis(Continued on Page 8)
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Laidlaw Environmental
Services operated a
hazardous-waste
inciner|
•i!. ator whose waste-water
discharges often violated
permit conditions.
Although a number of
violations occurred after
a citizens' suit was filed,
Laidlaw improved its performance and came into
compliance during the
course of the litigation.
The Supreme Court must
now decide whether the
Fourth Circuit erred in
holding that the plaintiffs'
claim for civil penalties
was constitutionally
'moot" because their
injury could not be
redressed by a civil penalty paid into the United
States Treasury in the
absence of a live claim
for injunctive relief.

I

chargers. Congress also authorized
the EPA to impose substantial monitoring and reporting requirements
upon the regulated community, an
authority that the EPA has exercised. Each permittee, therefore,
must monitor its discharge and
report the results to the EPA and
the relevant state agency. The determination of a violation is thus a
rather simple affair in many
instances, requiring only a comparison of permit conditions with the
permittee's actual performance.
The Clean Water Act also created a
wide array of sanctions for violations of the Act. The federal government was authorized to enforce the
Act through the use of administrative orders, civil actions for injunctive relief and civil penalties, and
criminal prosecutions. State agencies, moreover, were recognized as
possessing concurrent power to
enforce state-issued permits. And to
supplement as well as induce government enforcement, Congress
empowered private citizens to act as
private attorneys general to enforce
the Act. Not only could citizens
request injunctions to abate violations, but they could also seek the
imposition of civil penalties,
although legislative history indicates
that these should be paid-just as in
cases brought by the federal government-into the federal treasury.
With public access to dischargemonitoring information from every
permit holder in the country, this
provision held real potential for
large-scale citizen enforcement.
Citizen-suit enforcement, however,
had been relatively rare until federal
enforcement declined precipitously
in the early 1980s. Concerned about
this state of affairs, a number of
environmental groups embarked
upon a drive to enforce the Clean
Water Act by filing dozens of citizen
suits. The number of such suits,
however, has declined over the last

12 years. This decline may be due,
in part, to more consistent levels of
federal enforcement and to a number of judicial decisions that have
made it more difficult for citizens to
pursue these cases. In Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), the
Supreme Court held that the authorization of a citizen suit against any
person "alleged to be in violation" of
the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)(1)) meant that a citizen
could not file suit for a wholly
"past" violation. Nevertheless, a
citizen-plaintiff could pursue "a
good-faith allegation of continuous
or intermittent violation."
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
More recently, the Supreme Court
dealt with a citizen suit arising
under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA), a statute that may have
actually authorized the filing of a
citizen suit for a past infraction.
The Court held, however, that a
citizen-plaintiff lacked constitutional standing to sue when there was
no allegation of a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation. Steel Company v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 118 S.Ct.
1003 (1998). The Court concluded
that in such a case neither civil
penalties payable to the treasury
nor an injunction dealing with the
future inspection of records would
redress the plaintiff's past injury.

ISSUES
Is a citizen suit brought seeking
civil penalties under the Clean
Water Act constitutionally moot for
lack of redressability because the
defendant has come into substantial
compliance during the pendency of
the litigation despite the fact that
violations were occurring when the
complaint was filed?
If such a case is dismissed for mootness, can the citizen-plaintiff be

awarded attorneys' fees as a prevailing or substantially prevailing party
because the violations ceased as a
result of the litigation?
FACTS
For a number of years, Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.
operated a hazardous waste incinerator near the North Tyger River in
South Carolina. In 1987, the South
Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control (DHEC)
issued an NPDES permit to Laidlaw
that limited its discharge of mercury
and other pollutants into the river.
The mercury limit was not derived
from a uniform national effluent
limitation; rather, it was set at a
more stringent level to protect the
water quality of the receiving
stream. Between 1987 and the time
the complaint was filed, Laidlaw
violated the mercury limitation in
its permit 476 times and the nonmercury discharge limitations 420
times. There were also 900 monitoring or reporting violations during
the same time period.
These violations occurred even
though Laidlaw had installed new
pollution-control equipment in
1988. After a new pollution-control
system was constructed in 1991,
Laidlaw came into compliance with
all of its discharge requirements
except for mercury. The mercury
violations, in fact, increased in early
1992. On April 10, 1992, the
Friends of the Earth sent Laidlaw a
notice letter, as required under the
Clean Water Act, stating its intention to file a citizen suit pursuant to
the Act after the expiration of 60
days. Before the notice period
ended, however, DHEC filed suit
against Laidlaw in state court and
negotiated a consent decree in early
June that imposed a civil penalty of
$100,000 for all previous violations
and required Laidlaw to "use every
effort ... to achieve compliance."

Issue No. 1

The citizen suit was brought on
June 12, 1992. Laidlaw sought to
dismiss the suit on the grounds that
it was precluded by DHEC's diligent
prosecution of Laidlaw. The district
court denied the motion, finding
that the state's enforcement action
had not been diligent, in part,
because the $100,000 penalty did
not remove the economic benefit to
Laidlaw resulting from the violations. 890 F.Supp. 470 (D.S.C.
1995).

plaintiff." 149 F.3d at 306. The
Fourth Circuit also held that the
plaintiffs could not recover attorneys' fees since they had failed to
obtain judicial relief on the merits
of their claims and thus were not
"prevailing or substantially prevailing part[ies]." 149 F.3d at 307, n.5.

In July 1992, Laidlaw adjusted the
rate at which mercury was fed into
its incinerator and, later in the year,
installed additional equipment that
increased the ability of its carbon
filters to remove mercury. As a
result of these efforts, the number of
mercury violations subsided.
Nevertheless, the mercury limit was
violated 13 times after the citizen
suit was filed in June.

CASE ANALYSIS
The outcome in this case may well
turn on whether the holding in Steel
Co. will be limited to the particular
facts of that case-a citizen suit in
which the plaintiff did not and could
not allege a continuing violation-or
whether the broad language in Steel
Co. concerning the inability of civil
penalties to redress private harm
will be extended to a case in which
there were continuing violations at
the time the suit was filed.

After a three-day trial, the district
court found that Laidlaw was indeed
liable for the above violations. The
court also found that Laidlaw had
reaped an economic benefit of more
than $1 million from its permit violations, although it decided that a
civil penalty of $405,800 would be
an adequate deterrent. 956 F.Supp.
588 (D.S.C. 1997). The court denied
the plaintiffs' request for injunctive
relief since Laidlaw had come into
substantial compliance with its permit during the second half of 1992.
Both Laidlaw and the plaintiffs
appealed. The Fourth Circuit vacated the decision as moot. 149 F.3d
303 (1998). In doing so, the Fourth
Circuit concluded, based upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Steel
Co., that since injunctive relief had
been denied, the only possible relief
the plaintiffs could receive would
take the form of civil penalties
payable to the treasury, a form of
relief that would not "redress any
injury suffered by a citizen-

The Supreme Court of the United
States subsequently agreed to
review the Fourth Circuit's decision.
67 U.S.L.W. 3397 (March 1, 1999).

Standing in the way of this extension is the Supreme Court's earlier
decision in Gwaltney, in which
standing to seek civil penalties was
recognized as long as the complaint
contained good-faith allegations of
continuing violations. The Court, in
short, will have to decide whether
the "redressability" analysis in Steel
Co. should be limited to threshold
determinations of standing or
whether it should be extended to
what have been considered questions of mootness that can arise
after years of litigation.
The plaintiffs contend that the case
is governed by Gwaltney, not Steel
Co. According to the plaintiffs,
Gwaltney is indistinguishable from
this case since the plaintiffs there
alleged, unlike the plaintiffs in Steel
Co., an ongoing violation of the
statute. Thus in both Gwaltney and
the present case, the plaintiffs
sought relief that would have

redressed their injuries. Moreover,
by the time the Court issued its
opinion in Gwaltney, there had
been no violations for more than
three years.The only remaining
claim the plaintiffs could press
was for civil penalties. Despite
that fact, the Court specifically
held that the plaintiffs had
constitutional standing.
The plaintiffs also argue that
Gwaltney demonstrates in another
way that injunctive relief is not a
condition precedent to the imposition of civil penalties. In this regard,
the plaintiffs rely upon the Court's
statement that "citizens ... may seek
civil penalties only in a suit brought
to enjoin or otherwise abate an
ongoing violation." 484 U.S. at 59.
The plaintiffs contend that since
civil penalties can abate ongoing
violations by creating an economic
incentive for future compliance, the
penalties can stand alone, even
when injunctive relief is unavailable. In Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), moreover, the Supreme Court stated that
injunctions were not the only way
to ensure compliance under the
Clean Water Act and then cited civil
penalties as another enforcement
device.
In addition, five courts of appeal
have held that claims for civil penalties in citizen suits under the Clean
Water Act are not moot even after
claims for injunctive relief are no
longer viable because the penalties
serve as deterrents to further violations by defendants. The district
court in this case, furthermore,
noted that the civil penalty it
imposed would deter future violations by Laidlaw-thus, plaintiffs
say, these penalties would redress
their harm.
The plaintiffs also try to distinguish
Gwaltney and Steel Co. from the
(Continued on Page 10)
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present case by pointing to the difference in the standards for standing and mootness. While standing
serves as a gatekeeper to keep nonjusticiable cases out of court, mootness does not serve the same function. By the time mootness is raised
as an issue, a case has generally
been litigated for a considerable
period of time, sometimes years.
Thus, the cases making dismissal for
mootness difficult serve to protect
the rights and resources not only of
the parties but of the courts as well.
As a result, a defendant must meet a
heavy burden before a case can be
dismissed as moot, and the Fourth
Circuit erred by applying a standing
case, Steel Co., to decide a question
of mootness. In doing so, the plaintiffs argue, the Fourth Circuit has
undermined a carefully crafted
congressional program authorizing
citizen enforcement of federal
environmental law.
According to the plaintiffs, to help
ensure effective enforcement,
Congress placed a citizen-suit
provision in virtually all modern
environmental legislation. Congress
recognized, according to the
legislative history of the provision,
that because government would
never have the resources to fully
enforce the law, citizens would provide a vital and necessary supplement to government enforcement
efforts. Plaintiffs contend that the
Fourth Circuit's decision would
eviscerate this alternative enforcement device. First, if civil penalties
cannot be imposed for ongoing
violations as long as the defendant
comes into compliance at some
point during the litigation, defendants would have an incentive to
continue violating the Act for some
length of time, as well as an incentive to extend the litigation for as
long as possible. Second, citizens
would be less likely to invest years
of time and expense in a case
which, regardless of its original

merits, can be dismissed at a later
time with no consequence to the
defendant.
Laidlaw, of course, disagrees. In
doing so, it relies heavily upon the
language in Steel Co. to press its
argument that the requirements of
constitutional standing are as
important later in a case as at its
inception. Laidlaw contends, therefore, that the Fourth Circuit properly dismissed the appeal because
once the plaintiffs' claim for an
injunction was rejected, the case no
longer presented a justiciable case
or controversy under Article III of
the Constitution. In short, when
the appeal became focused solely
upon the amount of a civil penalty
that would be paid to the United
States Treasury, the plaintiffs were
pursuing a form of relief from which
they could derive no personal
benefit. At that time, these citizen
plaintiffs no longer had a cognizable
legal interest in the relief they
sought and thus no standing to
maintain the case.
Laidlaw concedes that the plaintiffs
may have derived some satisfaction
from seeing a company that caused
them harm pay penalties to the federal treasury. But Laidlaw cites Steel
Co. to the effect that such psychic
gratification is not an acceptable
Article III remedy. 118 S.Ct. at
1019. In fact, Laidlaw claims, again
citing Steel Co., that by requesting
civil penalties a citizen plaintiff
actually "seeks not remediation of
its own injury ... but vindication of
the rule of law-the 'undifferentiated public interest' in faithful execution of [the law]." Id. at 1018.
Moreover, according to Laidlaw, the
plaintiffs stretched Gwaltney out of
shape when they claimed that the
Supreme Court held that civil penalties can stand alone as relief in a
case since they can abate a violation. Laidlaw argues that the Court's

statement that "citizens ... may seek
civil penalties only in a suit brought
to enjoin or otherwise abate an
ongoing violation" (484 U.S. at 59)
is completely consistent with its
view that civil penalties can be
sought only in conjunction with an
injunction or declaratory relief,
because the Court failed to say or
imply that a penalty could abate a
violation.
In Laidlaw's view, moreover, standing cannot be conferred through the
deterrent effect of a civil penalty
because the real heart of deterrence
is the prospect of future penalties
for future violations, not the assessment of penalties for past wrongdoing. Since Laidlaw had come into
compliance years before the penalties were exacted, the threat of
future harm was extremely low,
thus rendering the deterrence argument tenuous at best. Indeed, if
there were a real possibility of
future injury, the court's primary
response would be to issue an
injunction rather than to assess
penalties for past violations in the
hope that the penalties might deter
continued misconduct. While
Laidlaw admits that penalties have
some general deterrent value, it
insists that such general deterrence
would not provide a plaintiff with
the kind of specific relief needed to
redress the plaintiffs own particular
injury.
Laidlaw insists that the plaintiffs are
incorrect in characterizing Steel Co.
as a standing case while characterizing the present case as involving the
less rigid doctrine of mootness. In
contrast to plaintiffs' stance,
Laidlaw contends that there is no
constitutional distinction between
the two doctrines, since they both
derive from the same Article III
requirement that courts only entertain cases posing a real controversy.
The ultimate question for addressing either mootness or standing,

Issue No. 1

therefore, is whether there continues to be a controversy for which
the court can provide redress.
In addition to vacating the district
court's ruling on civil penalties, the
Fourth Circuit in this case held that
since the plaintiffs had failed to prevail on the issue of penalties, an
award of attorneys' fees would not
be appropriate. The plaintiffs vigorously contest that conclusion and
insist that they would be entitled to
attorneys' fees even if the case were
moot. The plaintiffs argue that the
Supreme Court has recognized for
years that a lawsuit may produce
voluntary action by a defendant that
provides a plaintiff with all or part
of the relief it sought. And when a
lawsuit acts like a catalyst in bringing about the desired end, the
Supreme Court has held that a
plaintiff may be deemed to have
"prevailed" despite the absence of a
enforceable judgment.
According to the Fourth Circuit,
however, the catalyst rule was
rejected by the Supreme Court in
Farrerv. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103
(1992). In Farrer,the Court stated
that in order to prevail for the purposes of obtaining fees, a civil rights
"plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant
... or comparable relief through a
consent decree or settlement." 506
U.S. at 111. Plaintiffs contend that
this statement alone does not overrule the catalyst doctrine. First, the
Court in Farrerwas not addressing
a situation in which a defendant had
voluntarily modified its behavior in
response to a lawsuit. Second, it is
simply not plausible to believe that
the Court intended to extinguish
such a well-established principle of
law without explicitly indicating
that it was doing so.

Laidlaw replies that Farrerdoes
control, and it requires some kind of
enforceable relief before a party can
be deemed as prevailing for purposes of attorneys' fees. Even if the catalyst doctrine was not rejected in
Farrer,Laidlaw contends the plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees because the citizen
suit had nothing to do with the
company's compliance. Instead, it
was the company's own conduct and
the intervention of the state that
brought about the solution to the
mercury violations. Laidlaw also
argues that the question of attorneys' fees may not have been ripe
for decision by the Fourth Circuit
because in its view the district court
never had jurisdiction over the case
in the first instance.
Since this question of initial jurisdiction was not reached by the
Fourth Circuit and appears to
involve questions of fact, the
Supreme Court might decide to
remand the question to the Fourth
Circuit. It is possible, however, that
the Court will address the issue.
Laidlaw asserts that the district
court never had jurisdiction because
the plaintiffs never demonstrated
that the mercury violations had
actually harmed the environment.
Furthermore, Laidlaw argues that
South Carolina had diligently prosecuted a case against it, thus precluding a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act. The district court erred
in this regard, according to Laidlaw,
because it focused upon the amount
of the civil penalty rather than on
DHEC's long-term efforts to bring
Laidlaw into compliance, including
the June 1992 consent decree
requiring Laidlaw to "use every
effort" to cease its violations. Since
the plaintiffs can have no personal
interest in the amount of a civil
penalty that goes into a government
coffer, the diligent prosecution
inquiry should only be directed at

direct compliance efforts, not the
amount of a penalty.
Plaintiffs respond that in order to
have standing they only need to
show harm to themselves, not the
environment. And this showing has
been made, since their members
have demonstrated that they use or
would use the river and that their
use and enjoyment (such as fishing
and hiking) have been adversely
affected by Laidlaw's excessive discharges of mercury. Requiring environmental harm as a condition
precedent to enforcement of the
Clean Water Act, moreover, would
upset Congress' regulatory scheme
in the Clean Water Act, which
focuses primarily on discharges
rather than on the regulation of
water bodies. Congress made this
change in 1972 because it had
proved so difficult to link poor water
quality to a particular point-source
discharge. But even if a showing of
environmental harm were required,
plaintiffs claim that they have such
proof. The mercury limitation in
Laidlaw's permit was designed to
ensure that the river would meet its
water-quality standard for mercury-a standard that was violated,
due to Laidlaw's discharges, at least
134 times.
Finally, Laidlaw suggests that the
entire case has been mooted by its
closure of the North Tyger River
incinerator, the dismantling of the
facility, and the cessation of its
waste-water discharge. In Laidlaw's
opinion, therefore, the Court should
dismiss the Writ of Certiorari without dealing with any of the other
issues that have been raised.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the closure of the facility
does not moot the case. Laidlaw has
chosen to keep its NPDES permit
and could, if it chose, resume discharging at the facility. Even if it
never does so, however, the plaintiffs contend that the case is not
(Continued on Page 12)

American Bar Association

moot because the penalty assessed
in this case will help deter Laidlaw
and its corporate affiliates from violating their NPDES permit at four
other facilities where violations
have occurred and plaintiffs have
members whose environmental
interests have been harmed.
SIGNIFICANCE
Since the early 1970s, private citizens have been empowered through
statutes such as the Clean Water
Act and Clean Air Act to act as private attorneys general to enforce
most of the nation's environmental
statutes. This role has always been
controversial. Some would argue
that citizen-suit provisions enable
private citizens to sue over technical violations that government
enforcers believe are not serious
enough to merit formal enforcement. Others would contend that
the citizen-suit device is a crucial
tool that enables citizens to pick up
the slack when government is either
unable or unwilling to act.
In recent years, a number of courts
have been subjecting these cases to
closer scrutiny and, in some
instances, have more narrowly analyzed the standing that private citizens must have to enforce federal
environmental law. The decision
under review in this case examines
that line of analysis further.
Although the plaintiffs in this case
had standing when the complaint
was filed (because the discharger's
violations were ongoing at the time),
the Fourth Circuit's opinion held
that the case became moot when
the discharger eventually came into
compliance. At that point, there
were no violations to enjoin and,
according to the Fourth Circuit, the
plaintiffs could not be compensated
for past harm by penalties that
would flow, not to their pockets (a
form of relief that is unavailable in a
citizen suit), but to the United
States Treasury.

If the Supreme Court affirms, a polluter could avoid liability for civil
penalties in a citizen suit as long as
it comes into compliance at some
point prior to final judgment-even
if that takes years. Of course, a polluter could always have mooted the
imposition of injunctive relief by
coming into compliance, but this
case could also write off a polluter's
pecuniary liability for past violations. At least as damaging to citizen suit enforcement, however, is
the Fourth Circuit's holding that a
polluter is not obliged to pay attorneys' fees to a citizen enforcer
unless the citizen obtains an
enforceable judgment.
Should the Supreme Court affirm,
its decision might well be the death
knell for the catalyst theory of attorneys' fees, which provides that an
award of fees is appropriate when a
suit acts as a catalyst in bringing
about a defendant's compliance. An
award of attorneys' fees-a crucial
incentive for encouraging citizens to
act as private attorneys generalcould thus be thwarted by voluntary
compliance even when that compliance would not have occurred but
for the filing of the citizen suit.
Such an outcome would certainly
mean that fewer citizen suits would
be brought in the future. As a consequence, the level and vigor of government enforcement action at the
state and federal levels would
assume even greater significance,
while the role of private enforcement actions as a supplement and
goad to government action would
decline.
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